The largest slum upgrading effort so far in Indore – a million plus city in central India – and one of the largest in India was implemented during 1990-97. This was the Indore Habitat Improvement Project, which was funded by the British Government’s Department for International Development (DfID) (the erstwhile Overseas Development Administration (ODA)). The project used the highly acclaimed concept of Slum Networking as the approach to infrastructure provision alongside health and community development inputs. In 1993 Indore’s slum project was visited by the British Prime Minister. In 1994 it was honoured with the ’93 World Habitat Award. In 1995 it was visited by an international study group. In 1996 it was included in the Global Best Practices in the Habitat II Conference. In 1997 the project ended. In 1998 it was honoured with the Aga Khan Award for Architecture.
Obviously this was a spectacularly successful improvement project, or was it? In 1997 the DfID funded an impact assessment study of its city-wide slum upgrading projects for which its projects in three cities, including Indore, were taken up. The author of this paper was responsible for a substantive part of the in-slum assessment as a senior consultant. The findings of this assessment in Indore (based on a survey of nearly 600 families in 10 slums and focussed surveys on particular project components in 7 additional slums) were at considerable variance from what is projected in professional circles about the project. In 1998 the Oxfam conducted a study on urban poverty in a number of cities in India, including Indore. The findings of this study also did not suggest the existence of a substantive and highly successful slum upgrading intervention in the city.
This paper begins by describing two different views of this project. The first is the “on paper” view. This is the one that most professionals working in the field of urban slum interventions and following award-winning projects already know and is described only briefly. The second is the “on ground” view. This is the one that all those who live in, work in or walk through slums in Indore know. It is introduced in the form of the findings that emerged from the impact study conducted in 1997. The difference between these two snapshot views of Indore’s slum project are then explained in terms of some inferences on flawed and failed assumptions.
Next this paper tries to piece together the process of Indore’s slum project. Since the assumption is that the projected picture is not the real picture, the stated processes (in project intentions or in monitoring reports) could not have been the source for this part and are not referred to. This part of the paper draws, instead, on a less professional source of information - archives of the local print media. The project history so pieced together makes rather interesting reading. It also affords a clearer insight into why the two snapshots described earlier continue to co-exist. Unfortunately it shows the urban slum related professions in extremely poor light.
Finally in this paper some comments are made on inadvertent, but nevertheless worrying, wider impacts that have been triggered of by the process of Indore’s slum project. These affect not only the people in the project slums but also institutions within as well as outside Indore. Since the processes that have occurred in the Indore slum project are unlikely to be unique, it is suspected that these impacts are quite common in a project of this type. Thus the paper will explore what seems to be a barely acknowledged dimension of slum interventions.
1. Indore Habitat Improvement Project: the on paper version
The largest slum upgrading project so far in Indore, a million plus city in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, was implemented during 1990-97 at a cost of over Rs.600 millions for a population of about 400000 in 183 slums. The project was implemented by the Indore Development Authority (IDA) and funded by the Overseas Development Administration of the British Government (which is now the Department for International Development, but is referred to as ODA throughout this paper since that is how it is known in Indore).
By the time the planning of the Indore slum project was finalised in 1988, the ODA had been working on similar projects elsewhere in India and a fairly well defined formulation of ODA slum projects had evolved, consisting of three in-slum components: physical infrastructure, health and community development. The physical infrastructure component invariably included individual or community water supply, individual or community toilets and paving of streets. Street lighting and some amount of solid waste management were additionally included in many cases. The health component focussed on preventive health care and environmental health awareness, though primary health services were also provided in many projects. The community development component included creation of neighbourhood groups, vocational training (especially for women), adult literacy and pre-school and non-formal education. Later development of community saving mechanisms also became a part of the community development activities. Community halls were constructed for all slums in all the projects. The institutional mechanisms for implementation had also by then fallen into a set pattern. The projects were implemented through local bodies – either the municipal corporation or the development authority with monitoring and steering committees at the state level. Institutional capacity building through staff training and study visits to other project cities and abroad had become an integral part of the ODA slum projects. In many cases the ODA also funded some improvement of city infrastructure in support of the operation and sustenance of in-slum infrastructure provided under its projects.
The Indore slum project had all these features of an ODA slum project. There was, however, one significant difference – the project used the Slum Networking concept as the approach to infrastructure provision (Box-1). Indore was the first place where the Slum Networking concept was tried and, in fact, is so far the only one since, in both Baroda and Ahmedabad, the two cities that took it up subsequently, the experiment has not yet progressed beyond a single slum intervention to a networking intervention at the time of writing this paper.
Box-1: The Slum Networking concept
Slum Networking is a holistic approach to urban improvement in which slums are seen as an integral part of the city – a settlement network that presents an opportunity for change rather than a problem for the city.1
The concept of slum networking works at two broad levels – slums and the city
|Source: Diacon (1997).|
With the inclusion of the Slum Networking concept into the ODA project the details of the infrastructure component became quite different from those in other ODA projects. The Indore slum project envisaged individual toilets connected to underground sewage, individual water supply connected to a piped network, an innovative design of roads as storm water drains, and soft landscaping. Main features of these infrastructure components were as follows:
- Toilets: The project envisaged individual toilets for the entire slum population covered by the project (about 80000 families). This was on the assumption that individual toilets allow for dignity in use and responsibility in maintenance that community toilets cannot match.4 Underground sewage lines were laid under the project. This was done in a cost-effective manner through careful design that maximised gravity flow opportunities5 so that pumping was avoided and expensive items like drop manholes and vent shafts could be omitted. On the whole, cost per household came to a figure that compared favourably with, say, the UNDP twin-pit latrine option.6 Households were expected to take Gully Trap7 connections to discharge sewage from toilets as well as sullage from kitchens and bathrooms into the underground drainage.
- Water supply: The project had provision for individual water connections for slum households.8 A network of water mains was laid under the project and efforts were made to integrate existing sources so as to keep costs low.9 People were expected to take water connections from the municipal corporation. Good quality and adequate quantity of water were thus envisaged for all slum dwellers. Citywide benefits in terms of equalising water pressure were also expected.10
- Roads as storm water drains: Since sullage and sewage would be taken care of through the underground drainage, surface drainage was required only for storm-water. Through the innovative concept of roads as storm water drains11, the slum-networking approach dispenses with the need for squalid, conventional open drains12 and, at the same time, achieves major cost savings on road building13 and better living environment14.
- Soft landscaping: The project envisaged a substantial amount of soft landscaping. Only part of the right-of-way within the slum was to be paved and the rest left for landscaping at the initiative of the community, supported by the project. Soft landscaping was expected to improve the general ambience in slums in terms of attractiveness and microclimate and to contribute to the urban environment by allowing for ground water recharge. It was also expected to work as an engineering tool to realise the innovative and cost effective design of roads as drains.15
Box-2: Claimed citywide impacts of Slum Networking in Indore
Roads and drains: Out of 360 km of roads provided in the slums, approximately 80 km on the slum peripheries were linked up at the city level to reduce traffic congestion on existing city trunk roads… Given that natural watercourses passing through cities define ideal gravity paths and that slums are located along these water courses, it has been possible to develop a piped sewage network linking the slums. These links were located along the river banks and by using larger pipe diameters than needed just for the slums, the capacity of the main sewers installed was increased sufficiently to accept the larger city load.
River cleaning: As stretches of the rivers passing through the city centre were cleaned of sewage, they were turned into fresh water lakes and the banks were landscaped. 4 km of bank has been improved to date. Improvement of the riverbank has now become a continuous process. A further 1-km stretch was taken up in 1996. The old temples and stone steps along the banks were painstakingly restored. The riverbed was dredged to a grade and the surplus earth used to widen the banks. The slopes were stabilised by cutting the sides to the natural angle of soil repose and extensively planted… Pedestrian paths and gardens were laid on the banks. As the earthworks and landscaping stabilised short bund walls were built across the bed to retain the water. Thus in the monsoon times water flows freely over the walls but in dry summer months water is retained in the lake formed by the bunds. The city centre has thus been transformed into a major recreational area… a beautiful and popular picnic spot for local people. Surveys have shown that groundwater quality in wells near the improved stretches of the river is now significantly better than in those near stretches still to be improved. The cost of carrying out this work has been met from those wishing to provide commercial and recreational facilities on the riverbanks and has placed no additional financial burden on the project. Fountains and lights are being installed and maintained in the lake by industrial and commercial companies. A plan for extending the improvement of the riverbanks to cover the entire city has been developed.
Source: Diacon (1997, pp.38-41).
The slum networking approach is claimed to have benefited, besides about 450,000 slum dwellers in the project slums, an equal number of non-slum citizens (Box-2)
2. Indore Habitat Improvement Project: the on-ground version
In 1997 the Urban Poverty Office of the ODA commissioned an Impact Assessment Study (IAS) to gauge the impact of its citywide upgrading projects on the urban poor. Three ODA projects were covered in this study – Vishakhapatnam, Vijaywada and Indore. The IAS was designed to include in-slum studies and supporting institutional and city studies. The in-slum studies included qualitative work in 3-4 slums and quantitative work by way of about 500 household interviews in 8-10 slums in each city. The author of this paper was responsible for the quantitative work. In Indore 565 households in 10 slums where project works had been completed were interviewed as part of the main survey. The discussion in this section is based on the findings of this survey.
At the slum level, individual toilet and water connections were the project design features that set it apart from other large slum upgrading projects. But even at the end of the project only limited coverage was achieved in these components. Of the 565 households interviewed only 34 per cent had toilet connections and only 16 per cent had private water supply. Streets were frequently waterlogged and the quality of their surface did not suggest they would serve as effective storm-water drains and there was virtually no evidence of soft landscaping.
There were many reasons why people had not taken toilet connections. Some were tenants unable or unwilling to make the investment. Many had insufficient space to make a toilet or even demarcate a space for a wet area in their small hut. Many reported lack of time or money or awareness. Of the families with toilets connected to the underground sewage line as many as three-fourths did not have private water supply. In one of the 10 slums surveyed no water mains had been installed even though sewage lines were in place and people had connected toilets to them. It was obvious that for a household that has to fetch water from even a few yards away flushing the toilet would be a low priority use of the water. Perhaps on account of this (since unless toilets are flushed the sewage line is unlikely to attain its self-cleaning velocity) or, perhaps, on account of insufficient connections having been made the underground sewage line was choked in many places. In slums where infrastructure works had been completed a while ago the problem of choked drainage had become significant enough to be reported as a reason for not taking further toilet connections. Some claimed that the expense that they saw neighbours having to incur on getting choked drains cleared made them wary of taking a toilet connection. Some said they preferred the occasional hassle of cleaning a private septic tank to the routine hassle of cleaning a choked public sewage line. And some asked surveyors the counter question: would you connect your toilet to a choked sewage line?
The impact survey also found pervasive problems regarding quantity as well as quality of water supply. These problems were the main reasons for the fact that only 16 per cent of the households surveyed had taken water connections. Over a third of those using private taps reported that water supplied was rarely if ever clean. Most attributed the poor water quality to contamination from the underground drainage. In many places the drainage line was overflowing right next to water supply points. People also complained of contamination of other water sources like wells and tube-wells. Over two thirds of the households with private water connections reported inadequate water pressure. People had responded mainly by lowering their taps. During water supply hours head and shoulders of men, women and children (ones that are at least 4 feet tall) could be seen over ground level as they stood in “pits” that dotted the streets and filled water from these lowered taps. But still enough water was not accessed. There was a significant trend of ground water tapping. In these initiatives, local councilors played a major role by “providing” bore-wells, usually with large tanks for community storage and occasionally with a piped network for shared or individual supply points. This role appears to have had considerable political currency. But it does not augur well for ground water reserves, not to mention the absurd economic implications of situations where slums had both an underground network of water mains (provided under the project) and a network above the ground (provided through political intervention).
In the original approach, since kitchen and toilet wastes were to be discharged into the underground drainage, surface drainage was needed only for rainwater. What was proposed in place of conventional open drains, was an innovative concept of roads as storm-water drains. This had not worked mainly because most people had not connected to the underground drainage. As a result, the roads had come to function as sullage as well as storm water drains. In the absence of a solid waste component and the corporation’s refusal to take over the slums on account of choked drainage, domestic garbage added to the squalor. In many places the problem was compounded by overflow from choked drainage. Also the inappropriate gradient and poor quality of road surfaces often did not appear to be conducive to easy run-off of even just rainwater. All in all streets in many slums seemed more squalid than the squalid drains that the innovative design had meant to eliminate. It was hardly surprising that many felt that the conventional system of open drainage was better and had, in places, reverted to a modicum of it by digging drains along or in the middle of the roads.
The study also found no evidence of the soft landscaping that was intended to improve the environment as well as serve as an engineering tool. Even in slums where tree plantation had been taken up under the project, hardly any plants had survived. Nor did many households recall the initiative. In fact, many people viewed the fact of the entire right of way not having been paved as evidence of engineering/contracting corruption. Moreover, since the unpaved stretches became slushy even after light rainfall, most people had extended their plinth - if not their built-up space - right up to the paved part of the right- of-way.
Since the in-slum infrastructure had not met its intended objective of containing the sewage and sullage discharged from the slums in an underground drainage, the further intended citywide impact of river cleaning was also not realised. The river was still very much a polluted and stinking drain. While a lake had indeed been created, complete with pathways and shops on the banks and fountains and lights (though not quite with corporate investments), it was certainly no picnic spot. The lake stank just as much as the “river”. There were two boats but their operator said they were never used, nor were the landscaped lakeside paths or the lakefront shops.
From the condition of the (choked) drainage in slum areas it did not seem likely that citywide sewage infrastructure improvement benefits would have been realised either. Meanwhile the indiscriminate tapping of underground water in project slums, resulting from the combination of raised expectations and failed systems (both related to the project), was an unfortunate unintended citywide impact.
3. Some obviously flawed and failed assumptions
The Slum Networking concept is based on the delivery of an in-slum package of inter-connected infrastructure components. In practice these components could not be delivered in Indore as a package. The Indore experience brings to light the assumptions inherent to the concept that could be prone to failure in other places as well. These barely acknowledged lessons from the Indore experience are enumerated here.
The project assumed that all slum households could and would connect toilets and wet areas to the underground drainage once that was provided. Only then would all sullage and sewage generated in slums across the city find its way into piped sewerage, eliminating the need for open drains and making way for the citywide benefit of river cleansing. In this respect Slum Networking literature states:
“For the last forty years the standard sanitation solution in slums has been to build communal toilets… The justification for this is that slum densities are too high to find space for individual toilets but this has been shown not to be the case.” (Diacon, 1997, p.18)
This assumption seems flawed to the extent that, as found by the impact survey (for instance), there are bound to be large numbers of slum houses in which there is really no space to clearly demarcate wet areas or build toilets. There are also cases of tenants who may not be interested in making housing investments. A related assumption was that:
“Loans are available to help slum dwellers pay the small connection charge and also to carry out the construction of the toilet.” (Diacon, 1997, p.18)
This also seems to be a flawed assumption in the present situation regarding availability of credit to slum dwellers. In Indore a substantial effort was made to mobilise bank loans for toilet construction. Eventually, however, only a limited number of loans were actually forthcoming. A major problem related to the lack of tenure, an issue that is likely to be even more of a constraint outside the state of Madhya Pradesh (where a tenure law is in place).
Since the assumption that all slum dwellers, with or without loans, can and will make toilets if underground sewage is provided does not seem to hold, the further assumption that Slum Networking can provide a superior toilet option in a cost-effective manner also fails. It is claimed that in Indore:
“The cost of underground sewage and centralised treatment under the slum networking approach was Rs.1500 per slum family for the on-site provision and Rs.1000 for the off-site treatment and collection. This total cost of Rs.2500 is the same as that of a shared UNDP twin-pit latrine.” (Diacon, 1997, p.10)
This comparison holds only at 100 percent uptake. In Indore only a third of the households have connected to the underground drainage. Thus effective cost per family is three times what was intended. If the choked drainage dimension is included in the cost benefit comparisons, then the option seems even poorer.
Many engineers consider underground sewage systems too wasteful in terms of water requirements. Many environmentalists paint doomsday scenarios in respect of the urban water crisis in India. In this context the basic assumption of sufficient water supply to work an underground sewage system that covers veritably the entire city population merits closer scrutiny. It is very likely that most cities do not have the amount of water needed even if all other assumptions hold.
Even assuming that Indore, as a city, has enough water to work a citywide underground sewage system, the assumption that this sufficiency also manifests at the local level has certainly failed. The concept assumes that:
“Piped sewerage carries both sewage and foul water to achieve better flows. All families are encouraged to take individual water connections so that most of the water supplied returns to the sewer lines.” (Diacon, 1997, p.17)
As mentioned, the impact survey found 84 percent of the total households surveyed, including three fourths of those with private toilets, did not have private water supply. Although award submissions make reference to a mid-term evaluation that found house-to-house water supply installed, in reality there was no serious effort to monitor the uptake of water connections alongside toilet connections. The IDA was not aware of any mid-term evaluation suggesting large-scale water connections. In fact, in its Annual Review Report of October 1996 (very near the end of project) it says, “Water connection data not available.'' (p.22). Moreover, in places the project even installed sewage lines without installing water mains.
Regarding soft landscaping, it was assumed that people would be willing to take initiative and responsibility. The impact survey found slum-dwellers quite indifferent towards landscaping. A few said that when they did not have enough water to drink how could they possibly maintain plants? Meanwhile, since landscaping was intended, among other things, to help prevent soil washing into the drainage system and reduce the likelihood of blockages, the absence of landscaping has probably contributed to the converse. Moreover, the soil in question being black cotton is likely to have exacerbated the problem.
Flawed and failed assumptions such as the ones outlined above do explain in some measure the difference between the two snapshots of Indore’s slum project as put forth in previous sections. They do not, however, explain how two widely differing views have managed to co-exist for so long. In an attempt to get a grip on this dimension the process of the project as it unfolded in Indore has been pieced together from local media archives and is described next.
4. Indore’s Habitat Improvement Project – searching for reality (with the help of the archives of a local Hindi daily newspaper!)
Most citizens of Indore came to know of the British ODA16 in October 1987 through local newspaper reports about a 6-member team that was in the city to discuss a project worth several millions of rupees for the city’s slums.17 By July 1988 the Indore Habitat Improvement Project (IHIP) for the improvement of 183 slums (with a population of about 400,000) over a period of 5 years had been negotiated.18 On 6 March 1988 the final agreement for British assistance of Pounds Sterling 10,400,000 (Rs.390,000,000) was signed.19 But it was only after the Indore Municipal Corporation (IMC) agreed in May 1989 to take over maintenance responsibilities after the Indore Development Authority (IDA) had completed the project works20 that the British government accorded final approval to the IHIP in December 1989.21 Thus Indore’s slum project, originally meant to be implemented over five years between 1988 and 1993, finally started in 199022 and even then only at half speed. Community development work started in March 199023, the first community hall was inaugurated in August24 and by December, 40 neighbourhood groups had been formed.25 Most other works, however, including infrastructure development, started only late in 1991. The State level monitoring committee for the project was also constituted only in February 1991.26
The slow start of the project attracted flack from various quarters throughout 1990 and 1991. Local newspapers criticised IDA for its slow pace in general27 and for its poor project management with reference to the fact that the community hall inaugurated with much fanfare remained unused for months afterwards28. Slum dwellers also demonstrated against the tardy implementation of the project.29 ODA also expressed its dissatisfaction with project activities30 and emphasised the need for better pace of works.31 ”), Nai Duniya, 10.10.91. For the IDA, however, it was a busy time with staff recruitment, establishment activities, staff training and study visits. It was quite unfazed by the criticism and was sure of its ground vis-a-vis the donor. Upon his return from a study visit abroad a very senior official of the IDA announced the need for multi-storied tenements for slum dwellers, for which he was planning to submit a proposal to the ODA.32
The ODA, which had been critical of project’s progress till October 1991, came to appreciate the IDA’s efforts by January 199233 and had expressed its satisfaction with the project’s progress in May.34 This camaraderie between the IDA and the ODA was fortuitous in the run up to the British Prime Minister’s visit to Indore in January 1993. The progress of project activities in real terms, however, was not satisfactory enough to not require some stage managing during the Prime Minister’s visit. In this no effort was spared. John Major was to visit two improved settlements, spending 28 and 32 minutes in them. For the residents of these settlements their environment improved virtually overnight. Dustbins, toilets, bathrooms and even a statue of Buddha were frantically installed.35 Where people had extended their plinths into the areas reserved for street-side soft landscaping, these were demolished and hastily replaced with plants (often cactus).36 Residents blessed the British Prime Minister for this windfall.37 Cynical journalists wrote against this charade.38 And a cartoonist captured the spirit of the situation in his drawing of two IDA engineers in conversation, saying: “If only we had information of his arrival a little earlier we could have changed the huts into bungalows!”39
The British Prime Minister left Indore “very pleased to see the improvements”40. His visit proved useful in some ways. The duration of the ODA project was soon increased to 1995 (along with an increase in funding from Rs.390 millions to Rs.424.5 millions).41 The IMC put up a proposal to ODA for funding solid waste management equipment.42 The IDA declared one of the slums visited by the Prime Minister a model slum43. But closer to ground things remained unchanged. The media reported instances of mismanagement – such as when the colour TV set provided under the project was found not in the community hall, but in a private home.44 An erstwhile member of the high-level monitoring committee for the project alleged misuse of funds by the IDA and demanded a CBI probe.45 And there were charges from slums about poor quality of construction materials. The IDA reacted to various allegations with the counter-allegation that when IDA contractors refuse to “oblige” certain people such rumours are started.46 IDA’s defense fell through when, a fortnight later, at the end of May, a death from jaundice was reported in an improved slum. This was followed by complaints of several water-borne diseases from various ODA slums.47 slums”), Nai Duniya, 1.6.93. The widespread occurrence of these diseases was attributed to contamination of water due to rampant choking of the underground drains installed under the project.48 system of sewerage disposal”), Nai Duniya, 31.5.93. A local newspaper carried a highly critical article on the ODA project with special reference to the problems with its infrastructure component (Box-3). The problem continued well into July.49 diseases in slums”), 6.7.93.
Box-3: An on-the-ground view of realities around the time of John Major’s visit in 1993
When will the picture change?
4 years and more than Rs.210 millions down, there isn’t a single slum that IDA can show and say this is the ODA project. In some places more work has been done. These are the slums that ODA teams visit.
Of 50 slums in which underground sewage lines have been laid, in most the drainage is choked. And once choked, underground drainage is not easy to get going. No or poorly constructed chambers and defects in the levels of Gully
Trap outfalls have contributed to the problem. Also there is the question that when there isn’t enough drinking water where will there be water for flushing toilets. And underground drainage cannot work without water.
Excerpt from a local newspaper report50
In July 1994, Indore’s slum project was awarded the 1993 World Habitat Award from among 121 entries. The World Habitat Awards were initiated by the UK based Building and Social Housing Foundation (BSHF) in 1985 “in order to identify innovative and successful human settlement projects throughout the world which could be replicated elsewhere” (Diacon, 1997, p.68). The Indore project won the Award for its “pioneering work in developing an innovative and successful approach to slum improvement… Slum Networking” (Diacon, 1997, p.ix). The IDA’s progress report for the year had a picture of the trophy (just as the previous year’s report had had a picture of John Major’s visit). The local newspapers saw little to celebrate (Box-4) and one of the reports very cynically said that the project had
“…won the Habitat Award “in spite of slush, filth, inadequate water, roads full of pot holes…”.51
Box-4: An on-the-ground view of realities around the time of the Habitat Award in 1994
Into 1994 slum dwellers in Indore continued to allege use of poor quality materials52 and even complete wastage of project funds – as in the case of a settlement where 50 year old surface drains were dug up to make way for underground drains even though these were choked almost everywhere they had been installed.53
Problems of slush and filth became acute once the rains started in June 199454, especially so where infrastructure works had not been completed55 ”), Nai Duniya, 14.6.94.. Even political leaders joined in criticizing IDA and alleged corruption in drainage works.56
In March 1995 the duration of the project was extended to 1997 and the funding was increased to Rs.60.5 millions. The Habitat Award brought not only international acclaim but also “study teams” from other places. In August Mumbai requested information about the project57 and sent a team of two officers from the Bombay Metropolitan Regional Development Authority. In November an international visit sponsored by the BSHF visited Indore.58 This study team visited some project slums59, appreciated the project works60 and returned impressed with Indore’s slum project61. Unfortunately, the learning experience of the study team did not include some lessons that might have changed things for Indore if they had been picked up in time (Box-5).
Box-5: An on-the-ground view of realities around the time of the BSHF study visit in 1995
Besides infrastructure problems other problems had also been noted by then. The performance of neighbourhood groups was worrying. A newspaper reported from a survey of 31 such groups: “The Revolving Fund accounts were not in order. Maintenance of Community Halls was poor. Colour TVs were often found in private homes rather than in the Community Hall. There was enough evidence of political hijacking…”.64
Post-project sustenance problems were also emerging with the prevarication on the signing of the tripartite maintenance agreements between neighbourhood groups, IDA and IMC.65
Meanwhile, in Delhi the task of preparing the National Report for Habitat II was entrusted to the Human Settlements Management Institute (HSMI), the research and training wing of the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) under the overall supervision of a National Steering Committee. An Advisory Committee was also constituted for guiding the preparation of the National Report, which included a section on Best Practices. Indore’s slum networking featured as one of the 16 national “Best Practices” which were supposed to
“have resulted in tangible improvements in the quality of life and in the living environments of people in a sustainable way”66.
In Istanbul at the Habitat II Conference in June 1996 Indore’s slum networking was selected as a Global Best Practice. But this international acclaim, like others before, did not in anyway alleviate the plight of slum dwellers in Indore (Box-6).
Box-6: An on-the-ground view of realities around the time of the Habitat II Conference in 1996
In Indore’s slums June 1996 brought greater water shortages and more choking of the underground sewerage.
The ODA project was due to end in March 1997. An emergency meeting of the IDA’s Board was called in March to discuss the problem of ending the project without post-project arrangements having been instituted and a letter in this regard was sent to the state’s Chief Minister.71 The state government initiated efforts to keep the project going72 and, towards the end of March, the ODA extended its project by three months73.
Meanwhile the ODA’s impact assessment study (IAS) was underway and the slum selection in Indore was made at the end of March 1997 and the main survey work (the findings of which were reported earlier in this paper) was scheduled starting end of April 1997.
Also in March 1997 the local press reported on the danger of rampant water contamination in the slums74 as well as the imminent danger of large scale incidence of malaria and dengue fever on account of the contamination of the water in the Krishnapura Lake.75 This “lake” was created under the project in part of a main storm water drain to demonstrate the citywide benefits that could accrue from the provision of underground sewerage under the slum networking approach and was much talked about in various award citations. In reality, however, this “lake” looks very different from the pictures usually published (Box-7). It must be regretfully admitted here that the IAS did not draw upon local secondary sources of information outside of the project records. Had that been done, the sarcasm with which the author’s enquiries about the lake were met in course of the slum selection visit in March would have been easily understood earlier.
Box-7: An on-the-ground view of the lake (citywide benefit) at the end of project in 1997
The Krishnapura Lake was developed in part of the Khan River (more a storm-water drain) as part of the ODA project with additional local funding to demonstrate citywide benefits of slum networking. In slum networking underground sewage lines were laid in the slums, which meant that that the sewage and sullage that used to flow into the river would now be contained in sewage pipes flowing on either side of the river. It would therefore be possible to develop parts of the river as clean recreation areas. This was proposed all along the river stretch in a phased manner, starting with the Krishnapura Lake. The lake was to be created by building shutters in a small footbridge to stop the water. Besides the expenses on the sewer lines, the Krishnapura Lake development entailed expenses on chanellising and cleaning the river (Rs.2 millions), repair and shuttering of bridge (Rs.3 m), installation of three fountains (Rs.1 m) and fencing, etc. (Rs.0.5 m).76 The site of the Krishnapura Lake was one that had some old pavillions and steps on the riverside. In 1991 the state Housing and Environment Department allocated Rs.450000 for paving and planting around these and the IDA allocated Rs.150000 for lighting.77
Work on the Lake started in February 1991 with the eviction of squatters in the wider public interest.78 Very satisfied with development activities (although the lake had yet to actually take shape) the IDA began to discuss in Novemeber 1992 plans for another lake at Naulakha.79 In May 1993 IDA said that Krishnapura lake was likely to fill up in the coming monsoon.80 But the rains only served to disrupt the work that had not yet been completed.81 Meanwhile, some reservations was already beginning to be expressed about the fact that a lake was being developed in a part of the “river” without any attempt to clean the rest of it.82 The work on the lake that was to have filled up during the 1993 monsoons was still not complete by the 1994 monsoons.83 In January 1995 the IDA promised Indore a lake by that monsoon.84 In March Rs.850000 more were sanctioned for lighting up the lake.85 Indeed, by summer, works were completed.86
The lake did fill up during the rains in 1995 but the IMC did not or could not keep its promise of diverting fresh water from its water treatment plant into the lake.87 Already by the end of 1995 the quality of lake water had deteriorated and a report in a local newspaper criticised the IMC for having reduced the lake to a storm water drain even after an expense of more than Rs. 50 millions had been incurred on it.88 In early 1996 boating facilities were launched but had to be soon stopped because of the stinking water. For the same reason the shops developed on the lakefront also did not sell. By March 1997 the danger of vector-borne diseases originating from the contaminated lake waters had become serious.
The condition of the “lake” has only deteriorated. While the administration tends to pretend the “lake” does not stink, it is noteworthy that not even the pictures of this “picnic spot” included for award submissions do not have any picnickers in them !
N.B. Refer to Box-2 for what is claimed and internationally acclaimed in respect of this “lake”
Meanwhile, community development (CD) activities in the project had virtually stopped. This was partly because CD staff had lost credibility because they could (obviously) do nothing to solve people’s most urgent problem - that of choked drainage. Moreover, CD staff was pre-occupied with the court case they were fighting against the proposed disbanding of CD Wing at the end of the project. In the beginning of May the state High Court ruled that they should be absorbed into the state administration89 and the CD staff now became busy chasing the matter of their post-project postings. Infrastructure works were also halted when the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) failed to compensate IDA for expenses of Rs.22 millions that IDA had incurred (upon PHED’s suggestion) on increasing the diameter of the main sewerage line in some parts. IDA claimed it could not raise these funds from its own coffers and had to adjust the amount in the ODA account and so stopped other project works in the slums.90
Obviously the extension period of the project was not used for in-slum project activities. The ODA intervened and asked IDA to complete all works and close accounts by June 1998. Meanwhile, by June 1997, when the extended project was to have ended, there were clear indications that the issue of post-project maintenance of infrastructure going to become a very contentious one (Box-8). The situation was summed up in a media report some time later as follows:91
“Even after works worth millions there is filth and squalor and choked drainage. As a result of complaints regard back-flowing sewerage in some slums, IMC issued an official press release not only blaming the IDA but also demanding rectification of defects. IDA does not agree with IMC and, in its defence, says that, on the basis of this project, it has won an international award. Had its work been technically flawed, it would not have received this award.”
As in previous years, there were several reports of water-borne diseases in the project slums especially as the rains started. In October there was an outbreak of cholera in some project slums. These brought the matter of maintenance of the choked drains to the fore. IDA and IMC continued to level allegations and counter-allegations at each another, both disowning responsibility. This issue remains unresolved even now. By the beginning of 1998 there were indications of what appears to have emerged as a “solution” to this problem. Both blame and responsibility for the choked drains began to be placed on the slum dwellers! The city authorities announced that people who throw garbage (which chokes the drains) would be punished.92 In professional circles the “occasional” problem of choked drains on account of indiscriminate throwing of garbage was admitted to be a limitation of the project.93
Box-8: An on-the-ground view of the post-project sustenance issues at the end of project in 1997
At the beginning of the project it had been envisaged that the IMC would take over maintenance responsibilities once the IDA had completed infrastructure works in the ODA project slums. The IMC had, in fact, submitted a letter to the state government agreeing to do so.94 However, at the end of the project it refused to take over the project slums with all their choked drainage problems.
In May 1997 the author drew attention of the IDA to the findings of the impact study survey just concluded (reported earlier in this article). But the CEO and engineers denied the scale of the problem and attributed the alarming nature of the findings to a poor sample.
On June 22 the Mayor, Municipal Commissioner and IMC officers went on an inspection following complaints of storm-water and sullage accumulation in people’s houses after rains. Angry residents confronted them and said that infrastructure provided under the ODA project was a nuisance that they did not want. The Mayor directed his staff to pump the water out and to rectify any problems in the pipes and bill the expenses to IDA.95 Following the Mayor’s inspection the IMC publicly alleged that IDA had created problems for it by using inadequate pipe diameters in its underground sewage line.96 Four months later following a similar problem in another project slum, the Municipal commissioner wrote a letter to the Chief Executive Officer of the IDA blaming IDA’s carelessness in the matter of laying the sewage pipes for the filth and squalor currently obtaining. He claimed that this was not a maintenance issue but, rather, a problem arising from faulty standards and asked the IDA to rectify technical defects and, pending that, make necessary arrangements for removal of sullage as present conditions had made for great resentment on the part of residents.97 Three weeks later, the Mayor, in a letter to IDA’s Chairman demanded that drainage line defects be rectified before handing the slums over to IMC.98
On November 12 in a meeting of the Municipal Council the Chairman did not admit an adjournment motion moved by the opposition in regard to the outbreak of cholera in 4 ODA slums on the ground that these slums came under the IDA. Following this there was a meeting in the IDA in which the Chief Town Planner said that IDA had made an effort through the ODA project to improve the standard of living of slum dwellers, but the slums were under the IMC. The project’s Chief Engineer said that there was to be a handing over of slums to IMC after finalising a tri-partite arrangement. But in many slums, even after the neighbourhood group and IDA had entered the tripartite arrangement, IMC had not signed even though the certificate of completion of works and related drawings had been sent to them. He referred to the fact of Secretary, Urban Welfare Department and Divisional Commissioner also being of the view that maintenance of drainage in the slums was the responsibility of IMC. Referring to a suggestion made earlier by IMC, he said that there was no way in which open surface drains could now be provided in place of underground drainage under the ODA project.99
On November 13, 1997, in a bid to improve the situation, the Divisional Commissioner along with Mayor and officers from IDA as well as IMC visited a number of slums upgraded under the ODA project to take stock of the situation. He found that in several places the drainage problem had made for filth and squalor. He asked IDA and IMC to prepare for each slum a plan of action for solving the drainage problem through joint effort. The Mayor made it clear that IMC would not take over the slums until the drainage problem is solved.100
The issue of post-project maintenance continues to hang between the IDA and the IMC even now.[2002-08-24]
Through 1998, towards the end of which the Indore slum project made international news by winning the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, it appears to have constantly engaged the attention of the local media for less illustrious reasons.
On 9 March 1998, a local newspaper reported (in more than one and a half page) the findings of a survey it had conducted in 22 ODA project slums. The feature was titled “Conditions have not improved even after spending 600 millions”.101 On 18 April, another local newspaper carried on its front page a feature on the Krishnapura lake which reported the following:102
“Stink emanating from the lake has become past bearing… A shopping complex was constructed but has not been sold. Boating was started but had to be stopped because of the odour… The CEO of IDA, however, denied that there was any bad odour… “what happens sometimes is that with a gust of wind bad odour is sensed”. The Divisional Commissioner also says there is no bad smell as he has himself spent a couple of hours on the bridge, but adds that in view of complaints the administration is planning to install plants that could put an end to the bad odour. Some fish may also be dropped into the lake and the lowest of five sluice gates may be left open to allow some water to flow. The Project Chief Engineer said the lake had cost Rs.5,000,000 and another Rs.1,000,000 per year is needed for maintenance. He blamed the condition of the lake on the facts that people throw garbage into it and that public toilets constructed nearby to ensure people do not misuse the banks are not used.”
The infrastructure in ODA slums, especially the choked drains, made news once again in June 1998, when malaria and water-borne diseases took several lives. The city authorities responded by distributing chlorine tablets, sachets of ORS and packets of bleaching powder. But people said this was no solution to the rising incidence of diseases caused primarily by contaminated water. Indeed, over half the drinking water samples gathered from 225 slums between 19 and 20 June 1998 were found to be unsafe.103 The growing resentment of people manifested itself in an incident in one of the project slums where people smeared and hanged effigies of health officers as a mark of protest.104 The Indian Medical Association (Indore Chapter) warned that diseases like hepatitis, typhoid and cholera could take on epidemic proportions if nothing was urgently done to control them and said that substantive improvements were needed in the water supply and drainage systems in the city. The ODA project works were roundly criticised:105
“A councilor said that contamination of water was the result of the drainage and water lines running close to each other. Slum dwellers also attributed water contamination to the underground sewage line that is perpetually choked. A resident of a project slum, where one in four households were affected by water-borne diseases, said they were getting contaminated water from their taps for the last month and a half. The same had happened two years ago and two children had died of cholera. In another project slum water supplied from a tube-well through a piped network has become contaminated and residents attribute this to the choked drainage. In yet another project slum the overflow from the choked drainage is flowing into the well and water from the mains is contaminated. A Youth leader said that no one likes to wash with the tap water leave alone drink it. In several project slums the streets have been reduced to sullage filled drains. The choked drainage is overflowing onto the streets through broken inspection chamber lids and domestic solid waste is exacerbating the squalor.”
Attention was diverted from the epidemics when, on July 25, the state government announced the cabinet’s decision to grant leasehold tenure rights in ODA project slums.106 Although the state already had since 1984 a law granting tenure rights to urban squatters resident in the city prior to the enactment, through the life of the ODA project the matter of tenure for project slums had not been resolved. Several meetings at the highest levels in the state government had taken place in this matter, but even after the tenure Act was amended to extend the eligibility date to May 1998, no headway was made on the matter of tenure rights for the project slums. In implementing the amended Act the District administration had so far surveyed nearly two hundred slums which included only a dozen of the ODA project slums.107 Immediately after the state government’s announcement the Collector issued instructions for completion of the survey of slums within 10 days.108 In the context of the uncertainity that had prevailed so far, the state government’s announcement was widely and wildly celebrated by residents in the project slums.109
All three matters relating to ODA project slums that were making local news remained much the same for several weeks: the water-borne diseases,110 the corporation’s effort to control them,111 and the promises of tenure rights112.
In October 1998, when the national media was falling over backwards eulogizing the Indore Slum project after it received the Aga Khan Award, the local media reported on the award with not just cynicism but derision. It continued to report an on-the-ground view of the project on three matters. The first was the persisting and growing problems of “choked drainage, streets filling with slush even after light rainfall, smelly or contaminated drinking water, … incidence of water-borne diseases and malaria and complete indifference of authorities to the situation or complaints about it.”113 A local newspaper quoted some experts on the causes:114
“Experts believe that the main reason for failure of the drainage system is inadequacy of water. They also attributed problems to black clay soil that silts the drains when it enters them along with storm-water. Infrequent cleaning and the lack of garbage management facilities (especially in the context of the growing use of plastic bags) were other factors.”
Box-9: An on-the-ground view of “institutional learning” after the end of the project, 1998
(Or alternatively: a case of public hearing by an agency acclaimed for participatory slum interventions)
The second was about progress not being made on the matter of tenure rights that were announced in July.115 The third – a new one – was about protests against a riverfront commercial development scheme notified by IDA. Nearly 1500 people from affected slums demonstrated outside IDA’s offices.116 The demonstration was mainly on the grounds that the scheme was against the spirit of slum networking, for which Indore has received international acclaim, and involved undoing the work done by way of primary sewer lines, community hall, etc.117. Besides this, past performance of IDA on riverfront development by way of the Krishnapura Lake was nothing to write home about. The demonstration was also against the unfair process of “hearing” (Box). Although this does not directly relate to slum networking, it is included here for what it says about institutional learning, or just attitude, in an agency that has been repeatedly acclaimed for its “participatory” efforts vis-a-vis the urban poor.
5. Some worrying implications of awards
The history of Indore’s slum project as pieced together in the foregoing section shows how it was celebrated in professional circles year after year even as conditions on the ground became progressively worse. With each epidemic and protest from the people the project actually seems to have grown from strength to strength in terms of awards and extensions. It would seem that professional circles concerned with slum interventions are more concerned with (celebrating) interventions in terms of activity, even ideas, than with their impacts.
None of the flawed and failed assumptions inferred earlier in this paper were ones that could not or should not have been identified in a timely manner by the project monitoring systems that were in place, especially considering that so many people outside these systems did notice them. Obviously professionals related with the project were (and are) too busy admiring their trophies for experimenting than with learning from their experiment.
As any savvy professional, bureaucrat or technocrat anywhere in the world with any amount of class or finesse or “correctness” would tell anyone, awards don’t mean a thing. For that view alone award giving agencies, trusts and foundations would be well-advised to save their (and tax payers’ and charitable citizens’) money that goes into expense on award juries, awards, award presentations, study visits to award projects and administration of awards processes. The Indore experience throws up a number of other more serious reasons why this advice should, in deed, be taken. These reasons are by way of the manner in which the awards and acclaim that Indore’s slum project has received have affected various stakeholders and other actors and activities in the area of urban slum interventions.
Awards do matter to other government agencies – or rather heads of agencies - who are looking for quick and high profile solutions to slum problems. After, especially, the Aga Khan award slum networking has come to have a lot of currency and is at various stages of discussion and formulation in a number of city agencies. Interestingly, the author’s enquiries with some of these found that no one had considered it necessary to actually visit Indore. Perhaps the most interesting case of this mindless replication was that of a development authority which is in the process of developing a township where there are no slums so far. But even they were so enamoured by the awards that they believed they needed to do slum networking even without slums! The draft slum policy for India (which has come about at the initiative of the central ministry, ODA and HUDCO) clearly says that individual, rather than community services should be aimed at in slum upgrading (HSMI/HUDCO, 1999). This is likely to make the celebrated slum networking approach very attractive to a number of agencies, especially so in view of its claims of being cost effective (“comparable to UNDP twin-pit latrines”) and of the availability of bilateral and corporate funds for replicating successful innovative experiences.
Awards also do matter to funding agencies. In Indore for, instance, there was a very serious possibility of sourcing German funds through the HDFC for toilet loans. This appears not to have materialised for reasons of uncertainty on the tenure issue in project slums. As mentioned earlier, for exactly the same reason earlier attempts in the same project to mobilise loans from nationalised banks had remained limited. Meanwhile it did not even occur to the HDFC or the Germans to check if individual toilets at such a scale were a viable option given the usual urban water crisis. In this they cannot be blamed for they obviously considered it safe to assume that all award juries could not possibly have missed a (basic) technical flaw.
In the same set of “award affected” parties falls the corporate sector, an emerging sources of funds for services for the urban poor. In one of the “successful” experiences of slum networking a single slum has been upgraded in partnership with a corporate house. The corporate house claims to have participated in this venture not out of charity but out of an enlightened self interest premised on the fact that in a globalising business environment a squalor-free city would help them attract the best people to work for and with them (Chauhan & Lal, 1999). One would not expect the enlightened corporate sector to fall for the hard sell that they themselves use so effectively. Yet they did not consider it necessary to inform their enlightened perspective with a close and hard look at the reality in Indore (or they would have surely found that a squalor-free city was certainly not what they would get at the end of their enlightened work). This was obviously because they also trusted the awards.
A different set of effects of awards is seen in the case of implementing agencies and professionals, the salient ones being on institutional and professional accountability. In Indore the IDA responds to virtually every criticism of its work with the stock reply that if that were really the case they would not have got the award. Even the consultant to the project in a web-site response to the author’s on-the-ground comments on the situation (based on the impact study findings described earlier) chose not to react to the specific issues raised. Instead he enclosed a chapter from the report submitted to UNCHS in 1995 as part of an award submission and said that the project had “been visited and independently appraised by national and international experts and further evaluated by eminent international juries for both the achievements as well as weaknesses”. He added that was unfair to ask him to “respond to all letters and articles, some of which may not be fully, fairly and meticulously researched or documented.” Clearly professional circles consider any (eminent) award jury visit (invariably arranged by project staff) to a handful of slums (usually also selected by project staff) more meticulous than a systematically sampled household survey of nearly 600 families in 10 slums selected on the basis of various statistical strata constructed from available project monitoring information and other data.
The mixing up of ideas with impact at professional and institutional levels that awards abet not only affects accountability on past projects, but also institutional learning (or rather, the lack of it) in future activities. The IDA is in the process of drafting more riverfront development schemes and sourcing funds from agencies like HUDCO for these. This is after its recent experience of developing a “lake” in public interest with an investment of much more than Rs.50 millions and after evicting several squatter families from the location. The public interest that has been met by developing this “lake” is certainly not visible to the public. Meanwhile, also in the light of awards already received, its presentation of a new riverfront development proposal to HUDCO seems to have been well received.
Awards can also affect adversely inter-institutional relationships at the local level. In Indore the IDA is left holding the trophies and the IMC is stuck with the choked drains. IMC’s resentment at drawing the short straw is understandable and its situation is worthy of sympathy. It is veritably caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. If it does nothing about maintenance in the awarded project slums it is painted as the villain of the piece. If it agrees to take on the formidable task of “maintaining” the already defunct infrastructure it is in even worse soup. The “solutions” that are emerging from this chaos are, naturally, confused. At one level it is driven to blaming people for the mess (the same people who vote in municipal councilors). On the other hand it comes up with sporadic crisis managing interventions like pumping out accumulated sullage or, in a recent case, constructing individual toilets in part of a slum at substantial cost.
Meanwhile, all this seems to have seriously affected the institutional environment for future development planning at the local level. For instance, a recent meeting of the District Planning Committee (in which the IDA and IMC are both represented), instead of discussing future development issues, was reduced to IDA and IMC blaming one another for the problems of the ODA project.118 Likewise, a housing loan of the order of Rs.170 millions being negotiated with the HUDCO is repeatedly being referred to by the administration as something to look forward to in the context of problems in ODA project slums.119 Now this loan is being negotiated by the state Slum Clearance Board specifically for slum dwellers who have to be given temporary tenure rights and resettled elsewhere under the provisions of the amended tenure Act. Since a decision has already been taken by the state cabinet to grant permanent tenure rights in ODA project slums, it is surprising that the administration should be speaking of these funds in this manner instead of working out how best to utilize them for other slum dwellers. The non-implementation of the cabinet decision to grant tenure rights in the project slums also appears to be hanging between the awards (which precipitated the decision) and the ground reality (with IMC refusing to take over the slums with their choked drainage problem). All in all the much awarded slum project has become something that the institutional set up in Indore can, to use a vernacular proverb, “neither swallow nor spit out” leaving no room for anything else to be chewed upon either.
Perhaps the saddest effect of awards in such situations is on people. Perpetually faced with problems of squalid roads, constantly choked drainage and contaminated water, slum dwellers in the project slums are, perhaps, better described as project affected persons than as “beneficiaries” of Indore’s celebrated slum project. From their point of view the awards have celebrated their miseries and led to the condoning of errors of commission and omission against them. The resulting widespread feeling of cynicism and bitterness has completely undermined any faith they might have had in the “system” and any inclination to “participate” in its interventions. The feeling of having been let down is captured by the following comment of an old lady in one of the two slums that were spruced up for John Major’ visit in 1993:120
“Videsi Babu ke aane par yahan saab logan ki line lagi thi. Muncipality ne sab door saaf-safai karai thi. Par videsi babu ke jane ke bad muncipaliti ka koi saab nahin aaya. Basti ke raine wale log kai bari muncipality gayo par koi mahri nai sun reyo.”
(“When the English gentleman [John Major] visited, officers were queued up here. The corporation had cleaned up all over. But after John Major left, no officer ever showed up again. Slum residents have been to the corporation several times but no one is listening to us.”)
A very unfortunate illustration of just how much the “system” is at fault and how understandable the resentment of people is, is afforded by the case of one centrally located riverside slum of about 500 families, many of them engaged in rag picking. Under the tenure legislation of 1984 residents were granted temporary tenure rights. The slum was taken up for improvement under the ODA project. At present it is facing a threat of eviction on account of a riverfront development proposal. It now seems that even at the start of the ODA project it was clear that the slum would have to be relocated, but it was decided to install infrastructure works in it nevertheless so that in the mean time people could also benefit from the project.121 Unfortunately this was not told to the people. Not when infrastructure works worth more than Rs.1.5 millions were started in 1992.122 Nor when the British High Commissioner visited the slum in October 1991123 and again in October 1992.124 Not when the IDA Chairman and the Municipal commissioner visited it in June 1994 when a cleanliness effort through community contribution was launched.125 Nor when people started making investments in toilet construction and shelter consolidation. Nor in June 1997 when residents launched a massive community effort to de-silt the river (or rather the storm water drain) - an effort that was widely appreciated126 and as a result of which, for the first time in years, the settlement was not flooded during the rains. Nor in July 1998 when the state cabinet announced its decision to grant permanent tenure rights to ODA project slums. Nor in October 1998 when residents went to demonstrate against the riverfront development scheme and against not being allowed a fair hearing (refer to Box-9). The question that resentful residents would rightfully like answered is that while the administration may have the right to bulldoze its own celebrated investments of 1.5 millions, what gives it the right to undo the investments they have made on their own against implicit and explicit promises of tenure? By and large, slum dwellers in Indore must sadly feel that projects carried out and celebrated in the name of the urban poor are meant less for the poor and more for other stakeholders. Like a friend said to the author:
“Instead of arranging eye-camps with the administration for the slum dwellers, you could arrange an eye-camp with the slum dwellers for the next award jury!”
6. Concluding remark
“Everybody knows that the boat is leaking. Everybody knows the captain lied. … will disclose what everybody knows” (Cohen & Robinson, 1988)
This paper has described two different snapshots of Indore’s celebrated slum project. It has also explained the reasons for their difference in terms of some obvious flawed and failed assumptions. It has shown through a reconstruction of the project history that these widely different views of the project have existed virtually from the beginning. It has also discussed how the international acclaim given to choked drainage, contaminated water, epidemics and the general misery of people has had far-reaching impacts. It has, however, not answered the question why the co-existence of two extreme views was allowed to persist. That is not for the author to answer. That is a question that those who permitted this must answer to people in Indore and to concerned professionals.
- Chauhan, U. and Lal, N. (1999). Public private partnerships for the urban poor in Ahmedabad – A slum project. EPW, 34, 10-11 (13-19 March)
- Cohen, & Robinson (1988). Everybody Knows. Leonard Cohen Stranger Music, Inc. and Robinhill Music (ASCAP)
- Diacon, D. (1997).Slum Networking – An Innovative Approach to Urban Development. Building and Social Housing Foundation, Coalville, Leisc, UK.
- HSMI/HUDCO (Human Settlements Management Institute / Housing and Urban Development Corporation), 1999. National Slum Policy, Draft prepared for Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment, Government of India, 20 January.
- IDA (Indore Development Authority), 1993: Annual Review Report, October 1993
- IDA (Indore Development Authority), 1994: Annual Review Report, December 1994
- IDA (Indore Development Authority), 1996: Annual Review Report, October 1996
- Shelter (official newsletter of HUDCO), January 1996: “India’s initiatives for the Habitat II Conference, Istanbul, 3-14 June, 1996.
- Verma, Gita Dewan, 1997: ODA SIP Impact Assessment Study – Indore – Quantitative study report, Draft submitted to University of Birmingham / UPO, DfID, New Delhi.
- Verma, Gita Dewan, 1998: “Indore Slums: Findings of an Impact Assessment Study”. The Hindu. 26.11.98 (available on The Hindu’s Internet edition).
Newspaper Archive Material
- Chautha Sansar, July-October 1998
- Dainik Bhaskar, June 1997-April 1999
- Free Press, April 1998
- Indore Samachar, July 1998
- Nai Duniya, October 1987 – May 1999
- Nav Bharat, June 1997 – November 1998
- Swadesh, July 1998 see footnote 106
- 1. “Slums typically cover only about 5 per cent of the land area of cities… It is thus possible to have a massive impact on the city and its infrastructure by working only in these very small areas. Concentrating resources in these neediest areas is thus very cost effective.” (Diacon,1997, p.11)
- 2. “[There is] a strong association between slums and the water courses of the city. These water courses are known as “nallas” and are either man-made (open drains, large storm drains) or natural. The nallas form the natural disposal system of the city and slums are thus situated on the best gravity paths nature can provide. By using this natural infrastructure the need for expensive technology, e.g. pumping stations, is considerably reduced.” (Diacon, 1997, p.13)
- 3. “The new infrastructure provided in individual slums is linked to that of other slums and to the existing city systems in order to bring about significant improvements to the city as a whole. This creates an opportunity for improvements to be carried out which would have been impossible otherwise. For example, it would not be possible to clean a city’s rivers unless the discharge from hundreds of gutters in the slum areas was first sewered in closed pipes… As a by-product of Slum Networking the city [can have] a primary sewage network which serves not only the slums, but the entire city. By providing decent roads within and on the perimeter of slum areas it becomes possible to complete linkages within the city’s road network. This provides a substantially better road system at comparatively little cost and would normally be inconceivable in view of the disruption, costs and non-availability of land. (Diacon, 1997, p.10)
- 4. “A piped sewerage system enables households to have individual toilets. For the last forty years the standard sanitation solution in slums has been to build communal toilets, with the result that a lot of money is spent to provide a filthy and inadequate service. The justification for this is that slum densities are too high to find space for individual toilets but this has been shown not to be the case. Loans are available to help slum dwellers pay the small connection charge and also to carry out the construction of the toilet.” (Diacon, 1997, p.18)
- 5. “Sewage lines in cities conventionally run separate from nallas and often run along the main roads. These lines need to be on a slope and therefore deeper and deeper trenches need to be dug at great expense until a pumping station becomes necessary. By placing underground sewage lines along nallas/rivers the natural gradients serve to dramatically reduce the cost of an underground system.” (Diacon, 1997, p.17)
- 6. “Working at the larger scale enables solutions which are uneconomic at the local level to become economic. For example,[in Indore] the cost of underground sewage and centralised treatment under the slum networking approach was Rs.1500 per slum family for the on-site provision and Rs.1000 for the off-site treatment and collection. This total cost of Rs.2500 is the same as that of a shared UNDP twin pit latrine but the advantages are considerably greater, i.e., all families have individual toilets and a much cleaner living environment is created. The grey waters from kitchens and bathrooms are also dealt with, unlike the UNDP toilets approach” (Diacon, 1997, p.10). Further cost advantages were seen at the city-level. “The piped sewage system can also be extended to dwellings in non-slum areas of the city at only the cost of connection, thus bringing city-wide improvements at marginal costs. Since there is very little existing infrastructure in the slum areas it is possible to install a range of services without having to repeatedly dig up roads. Duplication is avoided and a comprehensive linking of the infrastructure can be planned and carried out. When extended to the entire city, the compound savings are substantial.“ (Diacon, 1997, pp.10-11)
- 7. “Inspection chambers (which account for 30 per cent of sewerage costs) were replaced with small intercepting Gully Traps which were small enough to be placed at the doorstep or even inside the homes. Unlike inspection chambers, gully traps ensure that any abuse of the sewerage system by individual households results in blockages at their own doorstep, instead of passing the problem onto the main sewerage lines. Maintenance of these gully traps is the responsibility of individual families.” (Diacon, 1997, p.18)
- 8. “The [water] supply is to individual households rather than community standposts and households pay a small charge to be connected to the supply.” (Diacon, 1997, p.19)
- 9. “Where there is a reasonable water supply in the slum it is preferable to selectively repair or upgrade the system rather than totally replace it… By incorporating existing facilities it is possible for an adequate water supply to be provided at a cost of Rs.450 per household instead of Rs.1000.” (Diacon, 1997, p.18)
- 10. “To achieve a more even distribution of water pressure looped networks are used in preference to branches and by integrating the slum supply into that of the rest of the city some branches can be turned into loops, thus helping to equalise the water pressure throughout the city and bring city-wide improvement.” (Diacon, 1997, p.19)
- 11. “Contrary to common engineering practice, the roads in the Slum Networking approach are placed in a slight excavation wherever possible, with positive downward slopes from high points to the drainage courses.” (Diacon, 1997, p.13)
- 12. “During periods of light rainfall the underground drains take the storm water but when there are periods of intensive rain, the road itself supplements the drains. Fewer storm water drains are thus needed and smaller pipe sizes can be used since the road sections attenuate the rain peaks.” (Diacon, 1997, p.13)
- 13. “Savings can be made when the roads are in excavation since sub-base thickness can be reduced, as can the depths of storm drains, sewer runs and manholes… The expense of road filling, which can be as much as 25 per cent of the cost, can be avoided.” (Diacon, 1997, p.14)
- 14. “By lowering the road, water drains onto the road from paths rather than from the raised road into people’s homes. This ensures that the slum dwellers do not have to live in permanently damp conditions throughout the monsoon season… [Also] sufficient fill is generated by the excavation to infill other low-lying areas to avoid pooling and flooding."”(Diacon, 1997, pp. 13-14)
- 15. “After the roads have been lowered the excavated material is used to fill up low-lying areas and re-grade the slopes in order to drain water towards the roads and storm drains instead of ponding on site… By grassing these areas clean and firm surfaces are provided at a fraction of the cost of hard paving. A grassed surface… also helps prevent soil washing into the drainage system and reduces the likelihood of blockages.” (Diacon, 1997, p.19)
- 16. The ODA is now the Department for International Development (DfID) but throughout this section it is referred to as ODA, like it is in Indore.
- 17. “Gandi bastiyon ke liye 24 crore ki yojna” (“Scheme worth Rs.240,000,000 for slums”), Nai Duniya, 8.10.87
- 18. “Buniyadi nagrik sewaon hetu 34 crore rupaiye manzoor” (“Rs.340,000,000 sanctioned for bsic services”), Nai Duniya, 28.7.88
- 19. “Indore ke ODA project par antim hastakshar hue” (“Final signatures on the ODA’s Indore Project”), Nai Duniya, 8.3.89.
- 20. “ODA project ke bad ki zimmedari nigam uthayega” (“IMC will take over maintenance responsibilities after the ODA project”), Nai Duniya, 29.5.89.
- 21. “Gandi basti or nadi paryavaran sudhar yojna ki swikriti” (“Slum and river environment improvement scheme sanctioned [by the British government]”), Nai Duniya, 3.12.89.
- 22. “ODA project ke antargat isi mah 6 bastiyon mein kam” (“Works to start this month in 6 slums under the ODA project”), Nai Duniya, 3.1.90.
- 23. “Tang bastiyon mein samudayik vikas ka silsila shuru” (“Community development works started in slums”), Nai Duniya, 17.3.90.
- 24. “Pehle samudayik bhawan ka udghatan 29 ko” (“The first community hall to be inaugurated on 29th“), Nai Duniya, 28.8.90.
- 25. “ODA yojna ke tahat 40 BVM gathit” (“40 Neighbourhood Development Groups formed under the ODA project”, Nai Duniya, 29.12.90.
- 26. “ODA project ki samiksha hetu samiti” (“Committee for reviewing the ODA project”) 15.2.91.
- 27. “Data chust 'pata' sust” (“Donor brisk, receiver lethargic”), Nai Duniya, 8.11.90.
- 28. “Samudayik bhawan mein gatividhiyan shuru nahin hui” (“Activities have not started in the community hall”), Nai Duniya, 14.11.90.
- 29. “Jhuggivasiyon ne rally nikali, gyapan diya” (“Slumdwellers took out a rally, submitted a memorandum”), Nai Duniya, 1.4.91.
- 30. “British dal swasth gatividhiyon se asantusht” (“British team not satisfied with health activities”), Nai Duniya, 17.11.90.
- 31. “ODA pariyojna ke karyon mein gati lana zaruri: Farness” (“Need to step up ODA project activities: FarnessDy High Commissioners
- 32. “Jhuggi vasiyon ko bahu-manzili imaraton mein basaya jayega” (“Slum dwellers to be rehabilitated in multi-storeyed houses”), Nai Duniya, 24.6.90.
- 33. “British adhikariyon ne pradhikaran ki prashansa ki” (“British officials praised IDA”), Nai Duniya, 29.1.92.
- 34. “British adhikari ODA project ki pragati se santusht” (“British officials satisfied with the progress of the ODA project”), Nai Duniya, 28.5.92.
- 35. “Jhuggi bastiyon mein nirman aur sajawat ke kai karya” (“Construction and decoration works in slums”), Nai Duniya, 22.1.93.
- 36. "’Unke’ istakbal ki taiyariyon mein jhuggi vasiyon ke bhag jage” (“Slum-dwellers turn lucky as preparations are made for “his” reception”), New Duniya, 20.1.93.
- 37. “Jhuggivasi vikas karyon ka shre John Major ko dete hain” (“Slum dwellers give credit of development activities to John Major”), Nai Duniya, 24.1.93.
- 38. “John Major ko rijhane ke liye nakli swarg” (“Fake heaven to impress John Major”), Nai Duniya, 23.1.93.
- 39. Nai Duniya, 23.1.93.
- 40. From his remark in the register of one of the slums visited by him.
- 41. “ODA project ki avadhi 95 tak badai” (“ODA project term extended to 1995”), Nai Duniya, 27.7.93.
- 42. “Safai hetu upkaran kharidne ke liye nigam ne 1.06 crore rs mange” (“IMC asked for Rs.10,600,000 for equipment”), Nai Duniya, 21.10.93.
- 43. “Bhim nagar ko adarsh basti man kar vikas karya karen” (“Carry out development works considering Bhim Nagar a model slum”), Nai Duniya, 12.1.94.
- 44. “TV set community hall ke bajaye makan mein” (“TV set in house instead of community hall”), Nai Duniya, 11.8.93.
- 45. “Pradhikaran ke karyon ki janch karvayen” (“Institue an enquire into the works by IDA”), Nai Duniya, 3.8.92.
- 46. “Vikas pradhikaran ki nazar mein shikayaton ke pichhe nihit swarth” (“In the eyes of IDA vested interest behind complaints”), Nai Duniya, 16.5.93.
- 47. “Tang bastiyon mein swasthya shiviron ka ayojan” (“Health camps arranged inaffected
- 48. “Jal mal nikas ki vyavastha hoti to hadsa tal sakta tha” (“The disaster could have been averted if there was aworking
- 49. “Gandi bastiyon mein bimariyan rokne hetu saghan karyavahi” (“Concerted efforts to containwaterborne
- 50. “Kab badlegi taswir” (“When will the picture change”), Nai Duniya, 19.6.93. This was a more than half page article in “Focus”, a section that carries a box at the top with the appeal: “If you consider this matter important please send this clipping with your endorsement to whoever you consider the most powerful public representative”.
- 51. “Indore ko vishvstariye samman, basti sudhar pariyojna ko safalta” (“World-wide honour for Indore, success for slum improvement project”), Nai Duniya, 23.7.94.
- 52. “Ghatiya samagri ka arop” (“Use of sub-standard material alleged”), Nai Duniya, 1.4.94. (Incidentally, this allegation came from one of the “show case” slums of the IHIP)
- 53. “Dhanrashi ki barbadi” (“Waste of money”), Nai Duniya, 27.4.94.
- 54. “Shahar ki tang bastiyon mein kichad aur gandagi se rehvasi pareshan” (“Residents in the city’s slums hassled by slush and filth”), Nai Duniya, 13.6.94.
- 55. “ODA ke tahat adhure vikas karyon se tang bastiyon mein kichar faila” (“Slush spreads in slums on account of incomplete works under the ODAproject
- 56. “26 lakh ke ghatiya pipe kharide” (Sub-standard pipes worth Rs.2,600,000 purchased”), Nai Duniya, 29.7.94.
- 57. “Jhuggi sudhar hetu mumbai ne Indore ki jankari mangayi” (“Mumbai sought information from Indore for slum upgrading”), Nai Duniya, 18.8.95.
- 58. “Pakistan sahit 14 deshon ke pratinidhi is mah Indore aayenge” (“Representatives from 14 countries including Pakistan will visit Indore this month”), Nai duniya, 1.11.95.
- 59. “Videshi pratinidhiyon dwara tang bastiyon ka daura” (“Foreign delegates visit slums”), Nai Duniya, 23.11.95.
- 60. “Adhyan dal ne ODA ke karyon ki sarahna ki” (“Study group appreciated ODA”), Nai Duniya, 24.11.95.
- 61. “Indore ki sarahna karte hue laute videshi” (“Foreigners return, praising Indore”), Nai Duniya, 26.11.95.
- 62. “Shahr ki tang bastiyon mein malaria piriton ka survey” (“Survey of malaria victims in the city’s slums”), Nai Duniya, 22.10.95.
- 63. “Tang bastiyon mein 11000 se adhik jwar pirit paye gaye” (More than 11000 malaria victims in slums”), Nai Duniya, 019.11.95.
- 64. “Basti Vikas mandalon ki gatha chinta janak” (“Worrying tale of naighbourhood groups”), Nai Duniya, 14.6.95.
- 65. “Tang bastiyon ke sambandh mein tin-pakshiye anubandh ab tka nahin” (“Still no tripartite agreement regarding slums”), Nai Duniya, 17.6.95.
- 66. “India’s initiatives for the Habitat II Conference, Istanbul, 3-14 June, 1996” in Shelter (the official newsletter of HUDCO), January 1996, pp.18-19.
- 67. “Tang bastiyon mein nigam dwara vishesh safai abhiyan shuru” (“Corporation’s special cleanliness drive in slums commences”), Nai Duniya, 24.7.96
- 68. “Varsha ke bad jhuggi vasiyon ki samasyaen badi” (“Problems of slum dwellers increase after rains”), Nai Duniya, 11.8.96.
- 69. “Aadhe adhure nirman karyon se kai kshetron mein pareshani badi” (“Incomlete development works increase problems in many places”), Nai Duniya, 26.9.96.
- 70. “Ghatia nirman karya” (“Poor quality development work”), Nai Duniya, 30.12.96.
- 71. “Pariyojna ke sambandh mein vichar ke liye baithak” (“Meeting to deliberate on the Project”), Nai Duniya, 12.3.97.
- 72. “Indore ki ODA project ko jari rakhne ke prayas” (“Efforts to keep Indore’s ODA project going”), Nai Duniya, 15.3.97.
- 73. “ODA pariyojna ki avdhi teen mahine aur barai” (“ODA extends duration of its project by three more months”), Nai Duniya, 21.3.97.
- 74. “Shahar ki karib 100 bastiyon mein jal sankat utpan hone ki ashanka” (Danger of water contamination in about 100 slums in the city”), Nai Duniya, 4.3.97.
- 75. “Krishnapura jheel mein sandadh; malaria or dengue rog failne ka khatra” (“Sewage in Krishnapura Lake; danger of malaria and dengue spreading”), Nai Duniya, 13.3.97.
- 76. “Krishnapura jheel yojna ki disha mein pehla kadam aaj rakha jayega” (“First step in the direction of Krishnapura Lake project today”), Nai Duniya, 26.3.92.
- 77. “Krishnapuri chhatriyon ke liye 4.5 lakhs ka aabantan” (“Allocation of Rs.450 thousands for Krishnapura pavillions”), Nai duniya, 7.1.91.
- 78. “Jhuggivasiyon ko hatane ki karyavahi prarambh” (“Process of evicting hutment dwellers started”), Nai Duniya, 26.2.91.
- 79. “Naulakha ksetra mein bhi ek jheel banane ki yojna par vichar” (“Discussion on scheme for a lake in Naulakha area as well”), Nai Duniya, 1.11.92.
- 80. “Kritrim jheel mein isi varsh barish ka pani bharne ki purn sambhavna” (“Every likelihood of rain water filling the Krishnapura Lake this year itself”), Nai Duniya, 4.5.93.
- 81. Caption under picture of Krishnapura lake, Nai Duniya, 8.7.93.
- 82. Caption under picture of Krishnapura lake, Nai Duniya, 5.7.93.
- 83. “Ab kewal khan nadi ke beech bulldozer chalane ka kam baki” (“Now only the task of running a bulldozer in the middle of the river remains”), Nai duniya, 3.6.94.
- 84. “Garmi ke aagami mausam mein log jheel ka lutf utha sakenge” (“People will be able to enjoy the lake this summers”), Nai Duniya, 31.1.95.
- 85. “Krishnapura jheel o jagmagane hetu 8.5 lakh ki yojna manzoor” (“Scheme worth Rs.850000 for lighting up the Krishnapura Lake sanctioned”), Nai Duniya, 3.3.95.
- 86. “Jheel dekhne ke liye kafi log aaye” (“Quite a few people came to see the lake”), Nai Duniya, 8.5.95.
- 87. “Bilawali ka pani bekar bahaya lekin jheel ke liye nahin diya” (“Bilawal waters wasted but not diverted to the lake”), Nai Duniya, 18.9.95.
- 88. “Adha crore kharch kar jheel banane ke prayas ko nigam ne nale mein badal diya” (“IMC reduces to a storm drain the lake that was attempted to be made with an investment of over 50 millions”), Nai Duniya, 19.12.95.
- 89. “ODA project ke karamchariyon va adhikariyon ki sevayen shasan mein sanviliyan karne ka aadesh” (“Court order for absorption of ODA staff and officers in state administration”), Nai Duniya, 4.5.97.
- 90. “Lok swasthya yantriki Vibhag se bhugtan ki pratyasha mein 2.2. crore Rs. kharch diye”)(“Rs.22 millions spent in the expectation of reimbursement by the Public Health engineering Department”), Nai Duniya, 25.9.97.
- 91. “Do anubhagon ke bich chal rahi anban ko dur karne ke liye ek prayas” (“An effort to resolve the differences between two agencies”), Nai Duniya, 13.11.97.
- 92. “Gharon ke bahar kachra fekne valon ko dandit kiya jayega” (“Those throwing garbage outside their homes will be punished”), Nai Duniya, 14.1.98.
- 93. Mr Parikh’s response to the author’s comment on the web-site of the Global Ideas Bank. Incidentally, this response also mentions the deliberate dumping of garbage in sewer manholes by Municpal sweepers in a bid to sabotage the system that they see as a threat to their livelihood. This suggestion was not very well received by sweepers in Indore.
- 94. “ODA project ke bad ki zimmedari nigam uthayega” (“Corporation will take post-project responsibility”), Nai Duniya, 29.5.89.
- 95. “Kalalkui kshetr mein vikas pradhikaran ke pipe bane pareshani ka karan” (“The Development Authority’s sewage pipes became the cause of nuisance in the Kalakui area”), Nav Bharat, 23.6.97.
- 96. “Nigam ne kaha pradhikaran ne musibaten khadi ki” (“Corporation claims development authority has created problems”), Nai Duniya, 23.6.97.
- 97. “Pradhikaran dwara dali gai sewer line ke prati nigam ka asantosh” (“Corporation dissatisfied with the sewer line laid by the development authority” ), Nai Duniya, 22.10.97.
- 98. “Mahapor ne kaha-takniki drishti se sahi nahi hain tang bastiyon ki drainage lines” (“Mayor says drainage lines in slums not technically sound”), Nai Duniya, 12.11.97.
- 99. op cit
- 100. “Bhraman ke dauran sambhag ayukt ne anek bastiyon main drainage ki samasya dekhi” (“Divisional Commissioner saw drainage problems in several slums in course of his round”), Nai Duniya, 14.11.97.
- 101. “60 crore kharch karke bhi halat nahin sudhre”, Nai Duniya, 9.3.98
- 102. “Stinking lake shows lack of IDA care”, Free Press, 18.4.98.
- 103. “Kewal goliyan batne se dushit jal ki samasya hal nahin hogi” (“The problem of contaminated water is not going to be solved by distributing tablets”), Dainik Bhaskar, 26.6.98.
- 104. “Ulti-dast ka prakop faila, do mrityu aur” (“Water-borne diseases spread; two more deaths”), Nav Bharat, 26.6.98.
- 105. op cit
- 106. “Indore ki 174 tang bastiyon ke 50 hazar parivaron ko sthayi patte” (“Permanent leasehold tenure for 50,000 families in 174 slums in Indore”), Swadesh; “Indore mein ODA ki 174 bastiyon ko sthayi patte” (“Permanent leasehold tenure for ODA’s 174 slums in Indore”), Indore Samachar; “ODA project ki 174 bastivasiyon ko sthayi patte” (Permanent leasehold tenure for residents of the ODA project’s 174 slums”), Nai Duniya, 26.7.98.
- 107. “ODA bastiyon ke hazaron parivaron ko patte nahin milenge” (“Thousands of families in ODA slums will not get tenure rights”), Dainik Bhaskar, 23.06.98
- 108. “ODA bastiyon ko sthayi patta praday karne ke liye prarambhik teyariyan shuru” (“Preparations for granting tenure rights in ODA slums begin”), Nai Duniya, 28.7.98.
- 109. “Viksit bastiyon mein sthayi patta diye jane ka swagat” (“Decision to grant permanent tenure rights in improved slums welcomed”), Indore Samachar, 27.7.98; “Bastiyon mein ab sthayi gharondon ke sapne” (“Dreams of permanent homes in slums now”), Nav Bharat, 27.7.98; “Rajya shasan ke nirnay se ODA bastiyon ka kayapalat hoga” (“The state government’s decision will transform ODA Slums”), Indore Samachar, 27.7.98; “174 bastiyon vale prafullit ho gaye” (“Residents of 174 slums elated”), Chautha Sansar, 27.7.98; “Tang bastiyon ke rehvasiyon ne khushiyan manai” (“Slum dwellers celebrated”), Nai Duniya, 27.7.98.
- 110. “Varsha ke bad jhuggivasiyon ki samasyaen badi” (“Problems of slum dwellers increase after rains”), 11.8.98
- 111. “Jaljanit bimariyon ki roktham ke liye saghan abhiyan jari” (“Concerted effort to control water-borne diseases continues”), 13.8.98.
- 112. “ODA bastiyon ke patte vitran ki teyariyan jaari” (“Preparations for tenure rights in ODA slums continue”), 20.8.98.
- 113. “Naliyon main pani ruka, drainage ke haal behaal: kai kshetron mein log bimar” (“Drains blocked, condition of drainage pitiful: people fall ill in many areas”), Nav Bharat, 02.11.98
- 114. “Pani ke abhav mein bhumigat drainage line dhwast” (“Underground drainage fails in face of inadequate water”), Chautha Sansar, 14.10.98
- 115. “ODA bastiyon mein rehvasiyon ko patte dene ka nirnay adhar mein, atikraman aur bade” (“Decision to grant tenure rights in ODA slums still to be implemented, encroachments on the rise”), Dainik Bhaskar, 23.10.98.
- 116. “Nadi sudhar yojna ke khilaf aaj pradarshan” (“Demonstration against riverfront development scheme today”), 27.10.98; “IDA ke karyalye ke samaksh pradarshan karti hui mahilayen” (“Women demonstrating outside the IDA’s offices” (Picture)), 28.10.98.
- 117. “Karoro ke vikas nasht kar nai yojna na laen” (“Do not bring in a scheme that destroys investments of millions”), 28.10.98; “IDA apne hi vikas karye ko nasht karne ki yojna bana raha hai” (“IDA formulating scheme for destroying its own development work”), 28.10.98.
- 118. “ODA Pariyojna ko le kar aarop-pratyarop” (“ODA project leads to allegations and counter-allegations”), Dainik Bhaskar, 21.04.99
- 119. “Tang bastiyon mein suvidhaon ke sandarbh mein karyashala” (“Workshop on services in slums”), Nai Duniya, 17.5.99.
- 120. “Tab saab logan ki line laagi thi, ab koi nahin sun riyo” (“Then officers were queued up, now no one is listening”), Nav Bharat, 05.01.99
- 121. This was told to a social worker who has been working in the slum for several years by Mr. Himanshu Parikh at his public lecture in May 1999 in response to her question to him about the current threat of eviction.
- 122. “Shekhar nagar mein 15 lakh ke vikas karya ka shubharambh” (“Inauguration of works worth 1.5 millions in Shekhar Nagar”, Nai Duniya, 9.5.92.
- 123. “British up-uchayukt ne gatividhiyon ki jankari li” (“The British High Commissioner took stock of [project] activities”), Nai Duniya, 9.10.91.
- 124. “British uchayukt dwara bastiyon ka nirikshan” (“Inspection of slums by British High Commissioner”), Nai Duniya, 24.10.92.
- 125. “Jansahyog se basti mein paryavaran sudhar” (“Environmental upgradation in slum through community participation”), Nai Duniya, 8.6.94.
- 126. “Jhuggivasiyon dwara shramdan ki anukarniye misal pesh” (“Slum dwellers set example of voluntary work“), Dainik Bhaskar, 23.6.97; “Chandrabhaga pul ke kshetra ke rehvasiyon ka sarahniye kadam” (“Appreciable initiative of residents of the Chandrabhaga bridge area“), Nav Bharat, 23.6.97.